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Abstract 
 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley to restore confidence in publicly traded corporations.  The 
Act changed legal ethics and decades old attorney-client privilege.  This paper explores its impact 
on business. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The “Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,” (the “Act”) is one of the most significant federal laws passed in the 
past decade.  Indeed, it may be the most far reaching law impacting public companies since the passage of the 
original Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934, which established the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and established rules for public issuers of securities.
1
  It runs 66 pages, has 11 separate titles, 
and 69 total sections.
2
 
 
The Act imposed reporting obligations on publicly traded corporations, established a new federal 
accountancy oversight bureaucracy, and it supplanted an industry-wide recognized oversight body.   It also 
prohibited accounting firms from providing some consulting services to companies they audit.  It expanded the 
definition of obstruction of justice, required certain corporate managers to sign off on financial reports to attest that 
adequate controls are in place to detect mistakes and fraud, required companies to create and disclose a code of 
ethics and to have a financial expert on the board of directors, and it also required companies to provide more 
information to investors when reporting "pro forma" numbers, or figures that are not in accordance with standards 
used for financial statements filed with the SEC. It also partly caused a change an in centuries old doctrine involving 
lawyers and the clients they represent – the attorney client privilege.  This paper explores the scope of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and its impact on the attorney-client privilege and ethics in American business. 
 
2.  History Of The Securities Laws In The United States 
 
2.1.  The “Roaring Twenties” And The Depression 
 
Prior to 1933, there existed few laws regulating securities in American. Laissez-faire was the government 
policy regarding the stock market in the early part of the 20
th
 Century.   During the roaring 1920‟s, fortunes were 
made and lost in the stock market as institutions as individuals, “played the market.”   
 
In late March 1929, just after the inauguration of President Herbert Hoover, the Federal Reserve Board was 
meeting every day behind closed doors. The “Fed” discussed many items, but primarily the volatile stock market 
and the national economy. The first of many 'mini' crashes and recoveries began on Monday, March 25, 1929. As a 
                                                 
1
  House Resolution 3763, 116 STAT. 745, Public Law 107-204, July 30, 2002 
2
  Securities Act of 1933, May 27, 1933, ch 38, Title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 74; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, June 6, 
1934, c. 404, Title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 881. 
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result, for the next six months, it was one of the most volatile times in market.  On “Black Tuesday”, October 29, 
1929, the stock market lost over 11% of its total value.  By the end of November of 1929, stock market investors had 
lost almost $100 billion in assets. In just two months in the fall of 1929, the market had lost 40 percent of its value. 
This marked the point where the Roaring 20‟s ended and the Great Depression started. The stock market continued 
to fall until July of 1932 with the Dow at 41.22, down 89.2% from its previous high (from 381.17 to 41.22.) The 
stock market did not see the previous high for another 22 years. 
 
In 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected President of the United States, defeating Herbert Hoover‟s re-
election bid.  FDR had campaigned on a platform promising the American worker a “New Deal.”  Shortly after his 
election, FDR, during his first 100 days in office, was able to get dozens of new laws passed and enacted.  One of 
those laws was the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933. 
 
2.2.  The Securities Act of 1933 
The 1933 Securities and Exchange Act is often referred to as the "truth in securities" law.  It sets out two 
basic objectives:  
1) That investors should receive financial and other significant information concerning securities being 
offered for public sale; and  
2) It prohibited deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities.  
The Act accomplished these goals by requiring the disclosure of important financial information through 
the registration of securities. Utilizing this information, investors, not the government, could make informed 
judgments about whether or not to purchase a company's securities. While the SEC Act requires that the information 
provided be accurate, it does not guarantee it. As a result, the Act provides investors who purchase securities and 
suffer losses with important recovery rights if they can prove that there was incomplete or inaccurate disclosure of 
important information. 
In general, securities sold in the U.S. must be registered. The registration forms that companies file do 
provide some basic, essential facts. In general, registration calls for: 
1) A description of the company's properties and business;  
2) A description of the security to be offered for sale;  
3) Information about the management of the company; and  
4) Financial statements certified by independent accountants.  
Registration statements and prospectuses become public shortly after filing with the SEC. 
Not all offerings of securities must be registered. Some exemptions from the registration requirement 
include: 
1) Private offerings to a limited number of persons or institutions;  
2) Offerings of limited size;  
3) Intrastate offerings; and  
4) Securities of municipal, state, and federal governments.  
There may, however, be certain state registration requirements in addition to the ‟33 Act (typically called state “blue 
sky laws”). 
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2.3.  The Securities And Exchange Act Of 1934 
A year after the 1933 SEC Act, Congress passed the 1934 Act which created the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. The Act authorized the SEC to utilize broad authority over all aspects of the securities industry. Some 
of the powers delegated to the SEC included the power to register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, transfer 
agents, and clearing agencies as well as the nation's securities‟ self regulatory organizations (“SROs”). The various 
stock exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange, and American Stock Exchange are SROs. The National 
Association of Securities Dealers, which operates the NASDAQ system, is also an SRO. 
The „34 Act also identified and prohibited certain types of conduct in the markets and provided the 
Commission with disciplinary powers over regulated entities and persons associated with them.  The „34 Act also 
empowered the SEC to require periodic reporting of information by companies with publicly traded securities.  
Companies with more than $10 million in assets whose securities are held by more than 500 owners must 
file annual and other periodic reports. These reports are available to the public through the SEC.  
The Securities Exchange Act also governed the disclosure in materials used to solicit shareholders' votes in 
annual or special meetings held for the election of directors and the approval of other corporate action. This 
information, contained in proxy materials, must be filed with the Commission in advance of any solicitation to 
ensure compliance with the disclosure rules. Solicitations, whether by management or shareholder groups, must 
disclose all important facts concerning the issues on which holders are asked to vote.  
The Securities Exchange Act required disclosure of important information by anyone seeking to acquire 
more than 5 percent of a company's securities by direct purchase or tender offer. Such an offer often was extended in 
an effort to gain control of the company. As with the proxy rules, this allowed shareholders to make informed 
decisions on these critical corporate events.  
The securities laws broadly prohibit fraudulent activities of any kind in connection with the offer, purchase, 
or sale of securities. These provisions form the basis for many types of disciplinary actions, including actions against 
fraudulent insider trading. Insider trading is illegal when a person trades a security while in possession of material 
nonpublic information in violation of a duty to withhold the information or refrain from trading.  
The ‟34 Act requires a variety of market participants to register with the Commission, including exchanges, 
brokers and dealers, transfer agents, and clearing agencies. Registration for these organizations involves filing 
disclosure documents that are updated on a regular basis.  
The SROs must create rules that allow for disciplining members for improper conduct and for establishing 
measures to ensure market integrity and investor protection. SRO proposed rules are published for comment before 
final SEC review and approval. 
2.4.  Enron, Global Crossings And Arthur Andersen 
After the passage of the „33 and „34 Securities Acts, Congress passed a number of tangential acts3 but the 
most significant addition to securities laws occurred with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  Part of 
the impetus for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was the recent, high profile bankruptcy filings of a number of companies, 
such as Enron, Global Crossings, and WorldCom, as well as the indictment of the outside auditor for those 
companies, one of the best known accounting firms in the world, Arthur Andersen, LLP. 
 
                                                 
3
  Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Investment Company Act of 1940, 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
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2.4.1.  Enron 
Enron is an Oregon corporation with its principal place of business in Houston, Texas. In 2001, Enron was 
the seventh largest corporation in the United States based on its reported revenues. In the previous ten years, Enron 
had evolved from a regional natural gas provider to a trader of natural gas, electricity and other commodities, with 
retail operations in energy and other products.  In January of 2001, Enron stock was trading at over $82 per share.  
At one point, it was ranked as high as #5 in terms of total revenue among US companies by Fortune Magazine in 
2002.
4
  
On October 16, 2001, Enron issued a press release announcing a $618 million net loss for the third quarter 
of 2001. That same day, but not as part of the press release, Enron announced to analysts that it would reduce 
shareholder equity by approximately $1.2 billion. The market reacted immediately and the stock price of Enron 
shares plummeted.
5
  The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which investigates possible violations of 
the federal securities laws, opened an inquiry into Enron on October 17, 2001, and requested in writing information 
from Enron. 
Ultimately, Enron filed for federal bankruptcy protection, at the time, the largest bankruptcy in U.S. 
history.  Its filing led to thousands of employees losing their life savings in 401(k) plans tied to the energy 
company's stock.  Although Enron still exists, it is a mere shadow of its former self. 
Many of Enron's problems stemmed from what are known in the tax laws as the establishment, and 
accounting for, “special purpose entities.” These SPEs can take many forms, but were used by Enron to transfer 
certain expenses “off balance sheet” and report equity that may have been realized, but not received.   
One of Enron‟s investments was in an Internet start-up company by the name of Rhythms NetConnections 
(“RNC”).  That investment increased in value by $300 million shortly after Enron‟s investment. Because of the 
federal securities laws, Enron could not sell the stock immediately. Despite this the company wanted to count the 
paper gain as profit, include that in their financial documents, and therefore make Enron shares of stock appear more 
attractive to investors.  
When the increase in value of RNC was discussed by the senior financial managers at Enron, they allegedly 
came up with an accounting technique to create a private partnership in the Cayman Islands that would protect -- or 
hedge -- the Rhythms investment, by locking in the gain. Ordinarily, Wall Street firms would provide insurance, for 
a fee, to protect such a risk. But RNC was such a risky stock at the time that insurance was unavailable at a 
reasonable premium.  Since the gain would amount to 30 percent of its profit for the year, Enron needed to come up 
with a different strategy.  
Enron‟s idea was to establish a SPE, which would purchase the gain in RNC from Enron.  That gain could 
then be shown as revenue on Enron‟s balance sheet.  Since the SPE was a separate entity, Enron did not have to 
show the liability of the purchase on the Enron financial statements.  However, since Enron established the SPE, 
sometimes funding it with Enron stock, the risk of loss, if RNC‟s paper profit decreased, or disappeared, was also 
born by Enron.  If the stock price of Enron or the tech company (RNC) fell precipitously at the same time, the hedge 
would fail and Enron would be left with heavy losses.  
Enron funded the SPE, which was named “LJM,” allegedly after the CFO‟s wife and two children. A 
number of other partnerships with shell companies were created, many with names like “Chewco” and “JEDI”, 
purportedly inspired by Star Wars characters 
                                                 
4
  Fortune, March 31, 2002, http://www.fortune.com/fortune/information/Presscenter/0,03302002F500, 00.html 
5
  http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usandersen030702ind.html, paragraph 6. 
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Eventually, the Internet boom wound down, and share prices started to come down on Internet stocks.  On 
October of 2001, Enron was forced to disclose $1 billion in losses, more than half from LJM deals gone badly. Thus 
began a chain of events that would destroy Enron‟s stock price, force it to file bankruptcy, and wipe out thousands 
of jobs and tens of billions of dollars in savings.  
On December 2, 2001, Enron filed what was then the largest bankruptcy in US history – with assets 
totaling $63 billion.  In February of 2002, Andrew Fastow, Enron‟s CFO, and former Enron CEO Kenneth Lay both 
appeared before Congress, which was holding hearings on the Enron matter.  Both invoked their Fifth Amendment 
rights against self-incrimination.  Almost two years later, Enron is still in bankruptcy.  Enron‟s auditor was Arthur 
Andersen, LLC. 
2.4.2.  Global Crossings 
Global Crossing was formed in 1999 from a merger between a Hamilton, Bermuda based fiber-optics cable 
specialist and a US telecommunications firm.  Initially, it was regarded as one of the most promising of the new 
generation of telecommunications providers that sprang up in the late 1990s.  
The company's stock market valuation at one point was as high as $75 billion. But the company built up 
heavy debts rolling out its high-speed optic cable network.  Global Crossing struggled with the debt incurred from 
building its global network, which links more than 200 major cities in 27 countries.  When companies stopped 
spending on broadband, its revenue stalled and, then decreased.  
Global Crossing came under fire for its use of swaps and disclosure of so-called “capacity swaps” in its 
trading documents, which allegedly made its financial statements look more profitable than they should have
6
  It too, 
used the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen as its auditor.
7
 
On January 28, 2002, Global Crossing filed for bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of New York and coordinated proceedings in the Supreme Court of Bermuda.   At the time of its filing, it 
was the fourth largest bankruptcy in history.  It had $22.4 billion in assets and $12.4 billion in liabilities.  Eventually 
it terminated over 9,000 employees.  Under its reorganization plan, existing common equity and preferred 
shareholders get no stake in the company. Global Crossing‟s creditors would get a combination of cash, new debt 
and new equity in the restructured company.
8
   
2.4.3.  WorldCom/MCI 
WorldCom (renamed MCI), which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in July of 2002 (with $104 
billion in assets -- currently the largest in US history), owns, through its UUNET subsidiary, a significant portion of 
the Internet backbone, as well as MCI/Sprint and a number of other telecommunications companies.
9
  It is the US‟s 
second largest long distance telephone company. 
Although precise measurement of Internet traffic is virtually impossible, UUNET appears to account for 
between 30 and 50 percent of traffic at any time. In addition, WorldCom provides other Internet services such as 
Virtual Private Networks, Web hosting and broadband access.
10
 
                                                 
6
  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1886014.stm 
7
  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1886014.stm 
8
  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1886014.stm 
9
  http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/18843.html 
10
 http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/18843.html 
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WorldCom‟s problems first came to light in late June of 2002 when it announced that it had overstated its 
earnings by $3.8 billion for the previous 16 months.
11
  That action resulted in a wiping out of $1.4 billion in reported 
profit in 2001 and $130 million in the first quarter of 2002.
12
 
When it announced its restatement of earnings, WorldCom said in a press release that it would also cut 
17,000 of its 85,000 employees worldwide, and it immediately fired its chief financial officer, Scott Sullivan.
13
   
Eventually, WorldCom restated earnings taking off nearly $11 billion over a 4 year period.
14
  Its auditor 
was also Arthur Andersen, LLC. 
2.4.4.  Arthur Andersen 
 
Arthur Andersen LLP was an accounting partnership that performed accounting and consulting services for 
businesses throughout the United States and the world. It was one of the so-called 'Big Five" accounting firms in the 
United States in 2001, having its headquarters in Chicago, Illinois, with offices throughout the world. 
 
For 16 years, up until Enron filed for bankruptcy in December 2001, Enron retained Andersen to be its 
auditor. Enron was one of Andersen's largest clients worldwide.  It earned tens of millions of dollars from Enron in 
annual auditing and other fees. 
 
Andersen performed both internal and external auditing work for Enron mainly in Houston, Texas, and it 
established within Enron's offices in Houston a work space for the team that had primary responsibility for 
performing audit work for Enron. In addition to Houston, Arthur Andersen personnel performed work for Enron in 
Chicago, Illinois, Portland, Oregon, and London, England.
15
 
On October 19, 2001, Enron alerted the Andersen audit team that the SEC had begun an inquiry regarding 
the Enron "special purpose entities" and the involvement of Enron's Chief Financial Officer. The next morning, an 
emergency conference call among high-level Andersen management was convened to address the SEC inquiry. 
During the call, it was decided that documentation that could assist Enron in responding to the SEC was to be 
assembled by the Andersen auditors. 
16
 
After spending Monday, October 22, 2001 at Enron, Andersen partners assigned to the Enron engagement 
team allegedly engaged in a wholesale destruction of documents at Andersen‟s offices in Houston, Texas. Andersen 
personnel were called to urgent and mandatory meetings.  The team was allegedly instructed by Andersen partners 
and others to destroy immediately documentation relating to Enron, and told to work overtime if necessary to 
accomplish the destruction. During the next few weeks, tons of physical documentation were shredded, and 
numerous computer files were deleted.
17
  
Among the documents cited by Prosecutors against Andersen was an October 12, 2001 memo that directed 
workers to destroy all audit material, except for the most basic "work papers." Document and file destruction 
occurred up to the date that the Securities and Exchange Commission issued subpoenas on November 8, 2001, to 
assist it in its investigation of alleged financial wrongdoing at Enron. 
 
                                                 
11
 http://www.internetnews.com/xSP/article.php/1377151 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 http://www.nwfusion.com/edge/news/2003/0722mciworld.html 
15
 http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usandersen030702ind.html 
16
 http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usandersen030702ind.html 
17
 Ibid. 
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Andersen and Enron were both indicted on obstruction of justice charges
18
 and, on June 15, 2002, a federal 
jury in Texas found Andersen guilty of a single charge of obstruction.  Andersen officially ceased doing public 
accounting business on August 31, 2002, and 26,000 Andersen US partners and employees lost their employment.  
Many partners and retirees lost a substantial portion of their life savings and pensions. All in all, over 2300 
Andersen public company clients were forced to engage new audit firms with all the disruptions and costs associated 
with an auditor change. 
 
3.  Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
3.1.  Authors Of The Act 
 
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland's Democratic senior Senator (elected for a 5
th
 6- year term in 2000), and 
Congressman Michael G. Oxley of Ohio‟s fourth district, serving his eleventh term in the House of Representatives, 
(Chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services), were the primary original authors of the Act. 
 
The Act is aimed primarily at “issuers” of public securities which now exist or soon will exist.  Section 2 of 
the Act refers to the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934, and mirrors the definition of an issuer in those 
acts.   
 
An issuer is any company that issues public stock, whose stock is publicly traded, or soon will be.  It will 
also include a company that has not issued public stock, but has issued public debt – corporate bonds.  Other 
“securities” (not just stock and bonds) may fall within the purview of the Act. 
 
 
 
 
3.2.  The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
 
The first section of the Act sets out the establishment and organization of a newly created Accounting 
oversight board – the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, known as PCAOB.  It answers to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, and it will oversee audits of public companies to ensure fairness and consumer 
confidence in the auditing system.  All public accounting companies are required to register with the Board by 
October 26, 2003. 
 
Current members of the Board are:  Kayla J. Gillan, Daniel L. Goetzer, Willis D. Gradison, Jr., Charles D. 
Niemeier, and William J. McDonough - Chair.  The Board is to establish accounting and auditing standards for 
companies regulated by the Act, including public accounting companies who act as auditors.   
 
The Board has come under criticism in the media for the salaries paid to the Board members.  All board 
members except the Chair will receive salaries of $452,000 per year.  The Chair will receive a salary of $560,000.
19
 
All of the Board members receive more than any member of the Securities and Exchange Commission (each 
receives $142,500 per year), than any member of the President‟s cabinet ($171,900 for the Secretary of State and 
Attorney General), or even the President of the United States of America ($400,000).
20
 
  
The Act provides that the Board has investigation, enforcement and punishment authority over public 
accounting companies, both domestic and foreign, although the Act does not establish in personam jurisdiction over 
the foreign accounting companies. 
 
                                                 
18
 Sec. 1512 
19
 Citizens Works, January 10, 2003, http://www.citizenworks.org/admin/press/accountingoversight-pr.php 
20
 Ibid. 
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3.3.  Reporting Requirements 
 
Section 302 of the Act requires Chief Executive Officers and Chief Financial Officers to personally verify 
the accuracy of the financial reports issued by their company.   
 
3.3.1.  Internal Controls 
 
Section 404 requires companies to have sufficient internal controls to assure accuracy for financial reports 
in place by June 15, 2004 (extended from the fall of 2003).  Small companies and foreign businesses have until 
April 15, 2005 to implement the controls.  Auditors, retained from outside the company or in house employees, will 
have to certify that sufficient controls exist by the deadline. 
 
Section 409 requires “real-time” reporting of events that may materially affect the company.  At present, 
there is no time period to certify compliance, and no set agreement on what “material events” are, but “real-time” is 
within 48 hours after the event occurs. 
 
3.3.2.  Time Periods. 
 
The Act specifies time periods for retention of financial work papers, correspondence, or any 
communications or documentation containing conclusions or opinions about audit information. 
 
In June of 2003, the NASD instituted new rules and regulations for its members mandating that all so called 
“instant messages” be retained for at least 3 years, and instant messages must adhere to the same record keeping and 
supervisory requirements as e-mail under the Act. 
 
3.3.3.  Criminal Penalties 
 
Section 802 specifies criminal penalties for destruction or alteration of documents.  After it was revealed 
that Arthur Andersen employees destroyed thousands of Enron records, this section was placed in the Act with teeth.  
Penalties for violation of 802 can be as simple as a fine, to up to 20 years in prison for a person who “knowingly 
alters, destroys, mutilates …" a record or document with the intent to impede an investigation. 
 
4.  The Attorney-Client Privilege 
 
The attorney client privilege is a legal doctrine that has been traced as far back as the 1500s in the England 
of Elizabeth I.   Its present form was described by John Wigmore in his famous treatise, Wigmore on Evidence.
21
   It 
protects communications by clients, both individuals and organizations, to their attorneys.  Without a waiver of the 
privilege, a legal excuse, or consent by the client, the attorney is prohibited from revealing a protected 
communication, except in very limited circumstances. In today‟s litigious society, the privilege prevents an attorney 
from testifying against her client (unless the privilege is waived), as well as from revealing client confidences to 
anyone else in general, provided they are confidences entrusted within the attorney-client relationship. 
 
Generally, to be protected, the communication must be with an attorney, or in some cases to the attorney‟s 
directly employed staff.  The protection extends to client statements, non-verbal communications or writings to an 
attorney, and the attorney‟s statements, non-verbal communications and writings to the client.  The communication, 
however, must be in the context of receiving legal advice. 
 
                                                 
21
 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 2311, 599 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Confidentiality is one of the 
"fundamental conditions . . . necessary to the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of 
communications…” [and its existence]  "… must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the 
relationship between the parties" before any privilege should be recognized. § 2311, 599. 
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There are some exceptions to the privilege. For example, an attorney who is a conspirator cannot claim the 
privilege if a co-conspirator is a client. 
 
The privilege exists for many policy reasons.  Considering communications to be confidential and cannot 
be disclosed is said to encourage complete truthfulness in the communication so that the attorney is apprised of all 
facts and situations faced by the client.  If communications were subject to discovery and disclosure, clients would 
not be entirely truthful with their attorneys.  And, attorneys who receive the disclosure will encourage the clients to 
come into voluntary compliance with the law.  
 
The attorney client privilege has generated controversy and a number of court decisions designed to 
establish a “bright line” of when the privilege exists and when it does not.  Historically, “confidential information” 
has been expanded to include various agents of both the attorney and the client,
22
 third parties with whom the client 
sought legal advice from a common attorney (joint clients),
23
 or with whom the client shares a common interest or 
community of interests but are represented by different attorneys.
24
  It has been expanded to permit different clients 
with different attorneys to share confidential communications in a joint defense effort.
25
 Through the concept of 
limited waiver, some courts have permitted the client to share his privileged communications with some third parties 
but not with others; in addition, courts have approved limited waivers indirectly through the use of protective 
orders.
26
  
 
In addition to this general principle of law, all state bar associations, as well as the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) have established ethical obligations on an attorney not to disclose confidential information 
received by a client in the context of legal advice.  Again there are limited exceptions, such as when an attorney is 
aware that a crime is about to be committed or physical harm may come to a third party.  In those cases, the attorney 
is generally able to disclose limited communications to prevent those acts from occurring, but there is no 
requirement that the attorney do so. 
In partial response to section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the American Bar Association, at its annual 
meeting at San Francisco, California, in August of 2003, substantially changed rules 1.6 and 1.13.  The new rules 
read as follows: 
Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information  
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents 
after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
                                                 
22
 See, e.g., Du Barre v. Livette, Peake 108, 170 Eng. Rep. 96 (N.P. 1791) (interpreter);  LaLance & Grosjean Mfg. 
Co. V. Haberman Mfg. Co., 87 F. 563, 564 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1898); United States v. United Shoe Machinery 
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950) (patent agents); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 907 (4
th
 Cir. 1965) 
(detective); United States v. Schmidt, 343 F. Supp. 444, 446 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (accountant); United States ex rel. 
Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1041 (E.D. N.Y. 1976)(secretaries and paralegals); United States ex rel. 
Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D. N.Y. 1976) (psychiatrist); United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563 
(5
th
 Cir. 1976) (handwriting expert); Flood v. Waste Mgt., Inc., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10822 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 
1989) (hypnotist). 
23
 In re Regents of the University of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30617, *9-10 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
24
 United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989). 
25
 Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8
th
 Cir. 1977) (en banc). 
26
 Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in 
imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or 
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the 
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in 
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's 
representation of a client. 
Rule 1.13 Organization as Client  
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly 
authorized constituents. 
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows facts from which a reasonable lawyer, under the circumstances, 
would conclude that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in 
action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal 
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, 
and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably 
necessary in the best interest of the organization. 
Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do 
so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to the highest authority in the organization, including, if warranted by 
the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization as determined by 
applicable law. 
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if, 
(1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest authority that can act on behalf 
of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action or refusal to 
act, that is clearly a violation of law, and 
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial harm to the 
organization, 
then the lawyer may reveal such information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits 
such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial 
injury to the organization. 
(d)  Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer‟s representation of an 
organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee 
or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of 
law. 
(e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer‟s actions 
taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), or who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the 
lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary to assure that the organization‟s highest authority in informed of the lawyer‟s discharge or 
withdrawal. 
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(f) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other 
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the organization's 
interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing. 
(g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, 
members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's 
consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate 
official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders. 
5.  Impact Of Sarbanes-Oxley In Light Of New Model Rules 1.6 & 1.13 
 
5.1.  Change In Corporate America 
According to a House Financial Services Committee staff report, the number of audit committee meetings 
has increased by more than a third since the passage of the Act.  In addition, 84% of U.S. multinationals have 
upgraded their auditing controls and compliance procedures.  Another development is that over 50% the blue chip 
companies belonging to the Business Roundtable report that they have already formed truly independent boards. 
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is up and running under the leadership of William 
McDonough, the distinguished former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  And the board 
successfully met its July 16, 2003 deadline for announcing registration rules for the accounting firms it oversees. 
5.2.  Erosion Of Attorney-Client Privilege In An Area Of Heightened Ethics 
 
One target of the Act was the perception that public companies could hide behind the “Attorney-client” 
privilege and self report securities violations, but not publicly report them.  In effect, this “confession” could serve 
as a defense to lawsuits in general and exemplary damages, but could be “controlled” by in-house or outside 
counsel. 
 
While each state has its own common law on the attorney-client privilege, most of the licensed attorneys in 
the United States belong to both their state association and a national association, the American Bar Association.
27
  
While membership in the ABA is not a requirement of any state licensure, it provides many valuable functions, one 
of which is to establish model rules of ethics as guidance for state associations to adopt, or not, as they see fit. 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was cited by the ABA as the primary reason for its August 2003 change in the 
ethical obligations of attorneys advising public companies.
28
 The ABA conference report notes that the Act will 
enhance communication both with in-house counsel and outside counsel.  It will enhance the contribution of board 
members to public corporations, and 
 
The new rule permits disclosure of an attorney where information would “prevent” a client from 
committing a crime, or fraud, which is “reasonably certain” to result in “substantial injury to the financial or 
property interests” of another.  The new rule, therefore, allows a lawyer to inform about potential, as well as existing 
                                                 
27
 “Bar” refers to a physical barrier in a courtroom that separates spectators and attorneys at law “admitted to the 
bar.”  When a lawyer (who does not have to be licensed) passes the state license exam, or otherwise satisfies the 
state requirements to practice law (waiver), the lawyer “passes the bar” or is able to sit in front of the physical bar 
in the courtroom that signifies to Judges that a person is licensed as an Attorney and Counselor at Law. 
28
 American Bar Association, Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, Section of Business Law, Section of 
Taxation, Section of Tort Trial and Insurance Practice, Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility, Section on, Young Lawyers Division, Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, Task 
Force on the Implementation of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Report to the House of 
Delegates, page 5 of 18. 
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and past client actions, if they have the potential to substantially harm another‟s financial interest.  There is no 
limitation on “another” or a clear definition of what injury is a “substantial” injury.  
 
5.3.  Possible Outcomes Of The Change In The Future 
 
The opening of the door to lawyer disclosure and the lack of definitiveness in the rule may expose attorneys 
to individual liability for failure to disclose.  A “substantial injury” to another‟s financial or property interest will be 
the basis for an individual to claim that a failure to disclose harmed them.  Each case will be litigated against a 
lawyer for breach of her ethical obligation of prior disclosure.  Each case will claim that the lawyer was “reasonably 
certain” of harm to another‟s interest.  Each case will claim that the individual suffered a “substantial injury” based 
on their individual financial or property situation. 
 
This rule, passed in a vague and broad manner in an attempt to convince the public that attorneys were 
concerned about ethical lapses at Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen, is a first step at an erosion of the 
attorney-client relationship in the United States.  It will expose attorneys to claims of unethical or unprofessional 
conduct by disgruntled investors who lost money investing in publicly traded stocks, bonds, and derivitatives. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was passed in an effort to achieve more transparency for public 
companies, avoid conflict of interests in auditing and accounting areas, and to restore public confidence in American 
commerce.  While the Act has resulted in a number of changes, the unanticipated change in the attorney-client 
privilege, as articulated by the American Bar Association, may be one of the more significant changes, for the legal 
profession itself.  Certainly the “tattle-tale” aspects of the new ABA ethical rule will be unattractive to in-house 
counsel, and they will go to great lengths to distance themselves from any information that would cause them to be 
“reasonably certain” that any information may have a “substantial harm” on the financial or property interests of 
another. 
 
The new ABA ethical rules will result in higher legal costs for corporations, and a classic “trap for the 
unwary” for counsel who does not take steps to protect herself individually.  While no state bar association has yet 
adopted the proposed ABA rule, certainly creative litigation will be inspired by the aspect of yet another “pocket” 
(counsel to public corporations) to pursue in the ever increasing brinkmanship of leverage litigation.   
 
